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I describe two amplifications mechanisms that operate during liquidity crises and discuss the scope
for central bank policies during crises as well as preventive policies in advance of crises.  The first
mechanism works through asset prices and balance sheets. A negative shock to the balance sheets
of asset-holders causes them to liquidate assets, lowering prices, further deteriorating balance sheets,
culminating in a crisis.  The second mechanism involves investors' Knightian uncertainty. Unusual
shocks to untested financial innovations lead agents to become uncertain about their investments causing
them to disengage from markets and increase their demand for liquidity.  This behavior leads to a loss
of liquidity and a crisis.
Arvind Krishnamurthy






We have seen (are seeing) a ﬁnancial crisis in which relatively small losses on subprime assets have triggered
a process leading to large reductions in wealth and output. The direct losses due to household default on
subprime mortgages are estimated to be at most $500 bn, yet the eﬀects of the subprime shock have been
far reaching (see, e.g., Brunnermeier, 2008, Gorton, 2008, or Blanchard, 2009, on the current crisis). Ob-
servers are blaming leverage, maturity mismatch, tight credit conditions, limited capital, opacity, complexity,
uncertainty, and suggesting various policy actions.
This paper oﬀers a simple framework to clarify the ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation mechanisms that are at work
during the crisis and explore the potential role of policy. By ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation mechanisms, I mean the
mechanisms involvingthe ﬁnancial sector that can lead a small shock to have a large eﬀect. Broadly speaking,
the factors that many observers point to can be classiﬁed into balance sheet ampliﬁers (e.g., leverage, tight
credit conditions, limited capital) and information ampliﬁers (e.g., opacity, complexity, uncertainty). I
present a simple model to discuss these two mechanisms.
The paper can be thought of as a literature survey around a model. The balance sheet ampliﬁcation
mechanism is the subject of an extensive literature and is often the ﬁrst reference during ﬁnancial crises. For
example, in the 1998 hedge fund crisis, the Russian default triggered a chain of losses that culminated in
the bailout of Long Term Capital Management. There was contagion, as the Russian default led to eﬀects
in seemingly unrelated markets such as the mortgage-backed securities market.1 The 1998 event has served
as motivation for a literature that describe the following mechanism: a negative asset price shock causes
balance sheet constraints on asset-holders to tighten, causing assets to be liquidated, lowering asset prices
further, and so on. There are diﬀerent versions of this mechanism, involving leverage, margin requirements,
limited capital, and shedding light on asset ﬁre sales, asset market volatility, contagion, etc. I discuss some
of the variants of the balance sheet mechanism that appear in the literature.
I next review an information ampliﬁcation mechanism that works through agents’ uncertainty. Many
liquidity crises surround ﬁnancial innovations that were rapidly adopted by market participants. In the
subprime crisis, the CDOs and associated credit derivatives that are at the center of the crisis, represent
ﬁnancial assets that have grown from less than $1 tn in 2000 to over $5 tn today. New innovations necessarily
mean that market participants have a short time within which they formulate valuation, risk management,
and hedging models. A liquidity crisis occurs when the new ﬁnancial assets behave in unexpected ways.
1For further details on the 1998 crisis, see Scholes (2000).
2Lacking a historical record to refer to, market participants are faced with risks they don’t understand, and
treat these risks as Knightian (Knight, 1925). Investors’ response in this case is to disengage from risks and
seek liquid investments, which can lead to a liquidity crisis dynamic. The main paper that I draw from in
discussing this mechanism is Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008).
Thus, one objective of this paper is to clarify these two ampliﬁcation mechanisms and discuss their
relevance during the present, and past, crises. The second objective of the paper is to clarify the role for
policy during a ﬁnancial crisis. In both models, there is a scope for ex-post policies, such as liquidityprovision
through a lender of last resort. The same forces that underly the negative-shock ampliﬁcation mechanism
also lead to a beneﬁcial ampliﬁcation of central bank liquidity provision. There is also scope for ex-ante
policies, particularly in the balance sheet ampliﬁcation mechanism. The private sector generally will not
internalize the full costs of a crisis. This opens the door to investigating preventive policies in the form of
liquidity requirements and capital requirements on the ﬁnancial sector. I discuss the scope for these policies
in both ampliﬁcation mechanisms.
This paper is organized as follows. The two ampliﬁcation mechanisms mentioned above are described in
Sections 2 and 3. In Section 4, I discuss the senses in which the model outcomes reﬂect the “lack of liquidity”
that many observers refer to in a crisis. In doing so, I also discuss how liquidity is measured in the empirical
literature. Section 5 concludes.
2 Ampliﬁcation through Balance Sheets and Asset Prices
Most investors in the sophisticated ﬁnancial markets aﬀected by liquidity crises – i.e. the mortgage and
credit markets in the current subprime crisis, or the sovereign debt and derivative markets of the 1998
crisis – are ﬁnancial intermediaries who are managing the funds of an ultimate household. Examples of
these investors are hedge funds or banks, as well as pension funds and mutual funds. Theory then suggests
that there may be agency conﬂicts between the household-investor and the intermediary that can aﬀect the
intermediary’s investment decisions. As in corporate ﬁnance, where a similar manager-shareholder conﬂict
arises, the intermediary’s investment will depend on external ﬁnancing conditions and the condition of its
balance sheet.2
2Shleiferand Vishny (1997) identifythis agency conﬂict and describe it as a “limit to arbitrage.”That is, in textbookﬁnance,
it is common to argue that if asset prices deviate from fundamentals, an arbitrageur will step in to proﬁt from the deviation.
As a result, the argument goes, prices will remain close to fundamentals. Shleifer and Vishny make the important point that
3Hedge funds raise equity from a clientele that is a combination of the managers of the hedge fund and
wealthy households/institutional investors. They raise debt, mostly in the form of repo ﬁnancing, from other
investors.3 Thus a hedge fund manages the funds contributed via both debt and equity contracts of some
ultimate household. If hedge funds have lost money, or if they are holding particularly illiquid assets during
a period of market illiquidity, investors may be unwilling to invest in either the equity or debt of the hedge
fund. In this case, the hedge fund may have to reoptimize its portfolio, selling some assets and holding more
liquid assets.
Mutual funds raise moneys predominantlythrough equity contributions of households. A well documented
regularity is that the investors in mutual funds withdraw their funds following poor performance. Again,
there is a relationship between the investment decisions of the mutual fund and its balance sheet (or change
thereof).
If asset prices depend on the health of investors’ balance sheets, then a feedback mechanism emerges
whereby a negative shock in the ﬁnancial market worsens balance sheets, reducing asset prices, feeding back
into balance sheets, and so on. I model this feedback and dependence on balance sheets.
2.1 Balance Sheet Constraint
The model has a unit measure of investors. I will label these investors as hedge funds. But one can equally
think of them as banks or institutional investors. I study a model in which the investment decisions of these
hedge funds are a function of the health of their balance sheets.
The hedge funds purchase an asset at date s at price Ps. They may need, for exogenous and endogenous
reasons, to liquidate the asset at a later date t at price Pt. In this section, I focus on the equilibrium price
determination at date t.
At date s, the hedge fund raises debt from households of ds and equity of Ps −ds, so that the total funds
raised are exactly enough to buy one unit of the asset. At date t, there are two states that may realize. In
state ω = B, one-half of the hedge funds (randomly chosen) have to liquidate their asset holdings and exit
the market. The liquidation need is exogenous to the model. However, as outlined below, the exogenous
the textbook arbitrageur is someone like a hedge-fund manager who is investing the moneys of a household. Agency conﬂicts
will place limits on to what extent the arbitrageur can exploit proﬁt opportunities. The Shleifer and Vishny observation has
spawned a large empirical and theoretical literature on the limits to arbitrage.
3A repo, or repurchase agreement, is a short-term debt contract that is collateralized by a ﬁnancial asset. For many hedge
funds, the predominant ﬁnancing tool is a one day repo agreement, that is renewed every day.
4liquidation may trigger endogenous liquidation by even those with no exogenous shock. In state ω = G,
there are no exogenous liquidation shocks. In the subprime context, we may imagine that the liquidity shock
is a loss in the hedge fund’s subprime investments that necessitates rebalancing its portfolio and forcing a
sale of the asset at price Pt.4
Deﬁne the equity capital of the hedge fund at date t as,
wt = Pt − ds.
This equity capital can also be thought of as the balance sheet liquidity of the hedge fund. That is, since
the hedge fund could sell the asset at date t at price Pt and repay ds of debt, the diﬀerence Pt − ds reﬂects
the liquid resources available to the fund.
For now, I ﬁx the debt level of ds exogenously and moreover assume for simplicity that the debt carries
no interest. I also assume that the debt level is lower than the lowest possible price at date t, so that the
debt can always be fully repaid. That is denote P as the lowest value attained by Pt. Then, ds < P.5
Suppose that the date t holdings of the fund are subject to a margin constraint. Deﬁne θt as holdings of
4 The only shock in the model is the exogenous liquidation need. The crisis literature often uses this modeling device and
examines how particular features of the economy may lead such a shock to cause a crisis. Diamond and Dybvig (1983), for
example, study how the exogenous liquidity needs of households who are the depositors in a bank can lead to a banking crisis.
There is a deeper question of where these household liquidity needs come from. Eisfeldt (2007) writes a model of a household
whose income process may be diﬀerent than its desired consumption process. The discrepancy gives rise to a demand for
liquid assets. However, Eisfeldt shows that a realistic calibration of the model does very poorly in generating the magnitude
of liquidity premia on assets that are observed in practice. Faced with a liquid, low return asset, and an illiquid, high return
asset, households time their purchases of illiquid assets to take full advantage of the high return asset without incurring any
of its illiquidity costs. In short, in equilibrium, households’ liquidity needs vanish and there is no demand for the low-return
liquid asset. The result is echoed in other papers in the literature (e.g., Heaton and Lucas, 1996) and suggests that we need
a theory of liquidity demand that does not center on households’ consumption needs. Here are some approaches that seem
promising. Vayanos (2004) presents a model of delegated fund management in which households withdraw funds from a mutual
fund following poor performance. As a result, the mutual fund manager alters his portfolio to favor liquid over illiquid assets, as
household withdrawal states appear more likely. In this approach, there are no “true” liquidity needs in the economy. However,
the inﬂexibilities that arise in contractual relationships between households and intermediaries create an endogenous source of
liquidity demand. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2007) study corporate liquidity demand. In their
models, ﬁrms face external ﬁnancing constraints that prevent them from undertaking all good investment opportunities. This
possibility leads them to insure, ex-ante, against those states in which the constraints are most tightly binding. The insurance
can be represented as a demand for liquid assets, which the ﬁrm can then use in the needed state.
5The debt contract of the model resembles fully secured repo ﬁnancing.
5the fund at date t (after any liquidations). The constraint is that,
mθt ≤ wt. (1)
The fund must have equity capital commensurate to the size of its asset market position. We may think of
m as a margin requirement per unit of asset holding, so that to hold θt units of the asset, the fund must put
up total margin of mθt.
Note that since wt is decreasing in Pt, the balance sheet constraint tightens as market prices falls. In
this sense, the constraint reﬂects an important feature of crises: market conditions and ﬁnancing conditions
worsen at the same time. The interpretation of m as a margin is close to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008)
who develop the margin interpretation of this constraint in depth, discussing the institutional rationales for
a such a margin constraint.
If we step back from the margins interpretation of constraint (1), it is worth noting that there are other
balance sheet constraints that appear in the literature which are close to (1) and importantly preserve the
relation between the constraint and market prices.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) develop a model in which lenders limit the debtor’s investments based on
pledged collateral. Suppose that the assets of θt can be pledged as collateral to a lender who forwards up to
γθtPt against these assets (where γ < 1). Then, to purchase θt units of asset, the budget constraint for the
hedge fund is,
θtPt ≤ γθtPt + wt
or, rewriting,
(1 − γ)Ptθt ≤ wt. (2)
This constraint, if we deﬁne m = (1 − γ)Pt, is identical to the constraint (1). There is a price dependence
on m which makes it diﬀerent. However, in spirit, this constraint also preserves the eﬀect that a reduction
in wt causes θt to fall.6
He and Krishnamurthy (2008a) develop a model in which an incentive conﬂict aﬀects the participation of
outside investors in a fund. In their model, a hedge fund manager as part of an optimal contract is required
to put up some of his own wealth into the fund. Denote the manager’s wealth as wt. He and Krishnamurthy
6To see this, substitute wt = Pt − ds into equation (2), to ﬁnd that,




As Pt falls, the right hand side of this equation falls, tightening the constraint and thereby reducing θt.
6derive a contract whereby outside investors are willing to coinvest in the fund, at most, a multiple M times
the manager’s investment in the fund. The coinvestment constraint implies that the total funds that are
under management by the hedge fund must be less than wt+Mwt. With these funds, the manager purchases
θt units of assets. Then the fund’s budget constraint is,




Ptθt ≤ wt (3)
This constraint is identical to (2), and again preserves the key interaction between wt and the asset position
θt. The fact that there are many contexts in which a constraint similar to (1) arises indicates that the
balance sheet mechanism may be pervasive.
2.2 Price at Date t and Crisis
Let us analyze the margin constraint in (1) further. Deﬁne,
lt = 1 − θt (4)
as the amount of asset liquidated by a hedge fund at date t that does not receive a shock. As noted earlier,
a fund that receives a shock liquidates one unit of the asset. If constraint (1) does not bind then lt = 0,
while if the constraint binds, substitute to ﬁnd:
lt = 1 +
1
m
(ds − P ω
t ). (5)
Liquidationsincrease as the price fallsand leverage (ds) rises, capturing the balance sheet eﬀect I have alluded
to. The required margin m has two eﬀects on liquidation. First, since ds is always less than P ω
1 , increasing
m increases liquidations. This is also apparent by inspecting the capital constraint (1) where raising m
tightens the constraint. Second, from (5) we see that raising m decreases the sensitivity of liquidations to
price conditional on the constraint binding. This is also intuitive from (1): if the constraint is binding, a fall
in wt tightens the constraint less when m is large.
In state ω = G, total liquidations across the hedge funds are,
LG
t = lt






I assume that there are other potential buyers (“deep pockets”) who can absorb these liquidations. Denote
Pt(L) as the demand function from these buyers. If Lt = 0, the price is Pt(L = 0) = ¯ P, where ¯ P may be
thought of as the long-term or fundamental value for the asset. If Lt > 0, the price falls below ¯ P, indicating









Figure 1: Liquidation Equilibria
The ﬁgure represents the equilibrium determination of PB
t , the price in the bad state. Price is
on the Y -axis and quantity liquidated on the X-axis. The negatively sloped curve indicates a
demand function from the deep-pocket investors. The vertical-then-negatively sloped line is the
hedge fund liquidation function, pictured for a low value of ds and a high value of ds.
Figure 1 illustrates an example of the equilibrium price determination for the B state. The price is on
the Y -axis, while the quantity liquidated is on the X-axis. The demand function from deep-pocket investors
7The price function also satisﬁes, Pt(L) > P > 0, indicating a positive lowest possible price.
8is represented by the dashed curve. The aggregate liquidation function, LB
t is pictured as the vertical-then-
sloped line. The vertical segment reﬂects the case of exogenous liquidation where one-half of the funds have
to liquidate. If price falls low enough so that lt > 0, then there is also endogenous liquidation, which increases
as the price falls.
If ds is low, then the only equilibrium is at point E1. The exogenous liquidation shock causes the price
to fall. If ds is large enough, then it is possible for the equilibrium to involve endogenous liquidation – this
is the sloped segment of the liquidation function. In the region in which there is endogenous liquidation, the
increased ds increases liquidation for every given price. Hence the liquidation function shifts upwards, when
ds is larger.
The ﬁgure presents three possible equilibria for the high ds case. The exogenous liquidation equilibrium of
E1 still exists. EquilibriumE2 is a moderate liquidationequilibrium where the price falls and the hedge funds
liquidate some of their holdings. Equilibrium E3 is the severe liquidation equilibrium: low prices and large
liquidations. In both E2 and E3 if agents expect prices to be low, they liquidate positions and push prices
down. Note that of the two liquidation equilibria, E2 is an unstable equilibrium (i.e. any perturbation of
prices or quantities moves the equilibrium to either E1 or E3), while E3 is the stable liquidation equilibrium.
The “crisis” in the model is represented as equilibrium E2 or E3. In these equilibria, the exogenous
liquidation needs interact with a weak balance sheet (i.e. high pre-existing debt) and lead to endogenous
liquidation and low value of P B
t . It should be obvious that in state G, the price is ¯ P since lt = 0. It is true
in the model that P B
t falls below ¯ P even in equilibrium E1, but I will not think of this as a crisis equilibrium
since it is purely due to the exogenous liquidation shock.
2.3 Ampliﬁcation of Shocks in State B
The model also illustrates an ampliﬁcation mechanism in the B state. Figure 2 redraws the equilibrium for
an alternative possible liquidation function, where the function is sloped in a manner that there is a single
equilibrium. The rise in ds moves equilibrium from E0 to E1. The comparison between E0 and E1 reveals
that there may be a large change in price and quantity. In this sense, a potentially small change in ds can
lead to an ampliﬁed eﬀect on prices and quantities. More generally, around the equilibrium E1, any shock
(i.e. exogenous liquidation) that perturbs either curve has large eﬀects on the equilibrium price and quantity
since both curves are negatively sloped. This latter point underscores how the balance sheet constraint can









The ﬁgure represents the equilibrium determination of PB
t , the price in the bad state. Price is
on the Y -axis and quantity liquidated on the X-axis. The negatively sloped curve indicates a
demand function from the deep-pocket investors. The vertical-then-negatively sloped line is the
hedge fund liquidation function, pictured for a low value of ds and a high value of ds.
Finally note that in comparing Figures 1 and 2, the liquidation functions have a diﬀerent slope. A
given change in price leads to larger change in liquidation in Figure 1 compared to Figure 2. The stronger
liquidation eﬀect leads to multiple equilibria. In this sense, the multiplicity in Figure 1 is just the extreme
case of a large multiplier, and the more generic result of the model is shock ampliﬁcation.
2.4 Related Ampliﬁcation Mechanisms
The feedback loop between the asset market and balance sheets illustrated by the model has been explored
in diﬀerent contexts within the literature.
As noted earlier, the m of the model can be related to Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) analysis of credit cy-
10cles. In that paper, a borrower debt-ﬁnances an asset purchase, providing an equity downpayment measured
by m. Thus, the borrower carries leverage proportional to 1
m (m is to be thought of as a small number).
A fundamental shock causes asset cash-ﬂows to fall, causing the borrower’s equity to fall more, given high
leverage. The borrower’s investment capacity going forward falls, which leads more of the asset to be owned
by a second-best user. The value of the asset to the second-best user is less than that of the constrained
borrower, causing asset values to fall, reinforcing the spiral. The Kiyotaki and Moore analysis shows how
leverage can lead to a large balance sheet ampliﬁer.
In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), m is a margin requirement that depends on expected market
price volatility, which, in equilibrium is a function of the actions of the constrained agents. They derive a
crisis equilibrium in which volatility rises, causing m to rise, triggering asset sales and further increases in
volatility. Thus their model shows how margins and volatility are related through what they label to be a
“margin spiral.” Vayanos (2004) presents a related analysis where the investors in a hedge fund withdraw
money if volatility rises. Vayanos’ model is fully dynamic which helps to understand the behavior of a risk
premium on volatility innovations.
In He and Krishnamurthy (2008ab), m parameterizes an equity capital constraint. It measures how much
equity outside investors are willing to provide to a hedge fund given the hedge fund manager’s own equity
investment in the fund. The hedge fund is assumed to invest in a risky asset that requires the investment
expertise of the hedge fund manager. Moreover, there are only a limited number of hedge fund managers in
the economy. Losses in the hedge fund trigger equity outﬂows that reduce the amount of capital the manager
controls, causing the hedge fund to sell some assets. When such losses occur across the entire hedge fund
sector, the potential buyers (i.e. other hedge funds) themselves are constrained. They have to buy assets
using less capital. To induce them to do so, asset prices fall and risk premia rise. The He and Krishnamurthy
analysis shows how risk capital and risk premia are related through a balance sheet ampliﬁer.
There is also work in a multiple asset setting in which the feedback loop can be used to explain contagion
eﬀects. Kyle and Xiong (2001) is representative of this work. The models in this branch of the literature
present the result that a shock in one market tightens balance sheet constraints and causes liquidations and
falling asset prices in another market.8
Somewhat further from my model, but capturing a similar feedback is the work of Garleanu and Pedersen
8In all of the papers I have mentioned, it is because assets are “marked to market” that there is a feedback loop. Plantin,
Sapra, and Shin (2008) build on this observation in analyzing the costs and beneﬁts of “mark to market” accounting rules.
11(2007). They develop a model in which a trader faces a constraint on how large an asset position it can take
that depends on how quickly the trader can expect to sell the asset. Asset trade is modeling in a search
framework. Thus, loosely speaking, m depends on the expected search time for a trader. They show that
it is possible that a tighter m constraint reduces search times in the market, and feeds back into a further
tightening of the m constraint.
Finally, the literature on banking starting with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) describes how maturity
mismatch can underly an ampliﬁcation mechanism. For example, Allen and Gale (2005) and Diamond and
Rajan (2005) present models in which a bank is funded by short-term demandable deposits and holds long-
term assets whose price is determined in a market equilibrium. There is a feedback loop between bank runs,
asset liquidation, and lower asset prices.
2.5 Crisis Policy
The multiple liquidation equilibria as pictured in Figure 1 is a coordination failure and can motivate central
bank intervention. There are a number of ways to implement policies to rule out the liquidation equilibria
E2 and E3. Here I discuss three possibilities that have some context in the current crisis.
1. Asset Purchase: The Federal Reserve has been active in purchasing mortgage-backed securities in 2008
and 2009, citing unusually depressed market prices.9 Many observers have argued for a more formal
central bank role as a “market-maker of last resort” in secondary markets (Buiter and Sibert, 2007).
Caballero and Kurat (2009) recommend that central bank policy should take the form of downside
insurance. If prices fall below some level, the central bank commits to purchasing assets at that price
(or insures asset-holders against losses in such a price decline).
We can see the eﬀect of such a policy within the model. Suppose that the central bank commits to
purchasing liquidated assets at a price P ∗ just above P E2. Then, the eﬀective demand function, now
from both deep-pocket investors and the central bank, has a ﬂoor at P ∗, thereby ruling out the E2
and E3 crisis equilibria.
2. Discount Window Lending: The Federal Reserve has oﬀered to ﬁnance the asset holdings of commercial
and investment banks at margin requirements far lower than is oﬀered in private-sector transactions.
The clearest case of this is lending against subprime mortgage-backed securities, where the Discount
9See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125b.htm.
12Window lends at 0.90 to the dollar, while the private market has essentially shut down. Consider again
the constraint (1). The constraint requires that a hedge fund put up a margin of mθt in order to hold
θt units of the asset. We can readily interpret this constraint to mean (as I have when discussing the
model in terms of Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) that lenders are willing to provide (1 − m) of ﬁnancing
collateralized by one unit of the asset if the hedge fund puts up m of its own resources. Thus, in my
discount window example, the 0.90 translates into an m of 0.10.
Suppose that the central bank commits through the discount window to oﬀer ﬁnancing at a margin
requirement m∗ < m if the price falls below P ∗. Then, in the region where Pt < P ∗ (for P ∗ just above
P E2), endogenous liquidation is positive if,
lt = 1 −
1
m∗(Pt − ds) > 0.
In terms of Pt, the price must be low enough that,
Pt − ds < m∗
in order to fall into the region of endogenous liquidation and crisis. By lowering m∗, the policy lowers
the price below which endogenous liquidation is triggered. Indeed if m∗ = P ∗−ds, the central bank can
rule out the crisis equilibria. The policy has the eﬀect of shifting the liquidation function downwards
in Figure 1.
3. Equity Injection: The Treasury has been active in injecting equity into the ﬁnancial sector. Suppose
that the government invests e more capital into hedge funds if Pt < P ∗. The beneﬁt of such policy is
that it directly relaxes the constraint (1) by raising wt. In the region where such injections take place,
endogenous liquidation is,
lt = 1 −
1
m
(Pt + e − ds).
It is apparent that increasing e works exactly like decreasing ds. As in Figure 1, a decrease in ds shifts
downwards the liquidation function and thereby rules out the crisis equilibria.
In a more dynamic formulation, one can also consider a debt-for-equity swap. That is imagine a date
just prior to date t, where the government forces some of the debt-holders to accept equity claims in
place of their debt claims. This policy reduces ds, so that at date t, the liquidation crisis may be
avoided. The next section develops a closely related point by considering debt choices at date s.
132.6 Ex-ante Policy
The balance-sheet model opens the door to studying ex-ante policy. That is, the possibility of multiple
equilibria at date t in the model indicates that there is an externality among agents. If we focus on date
s < t, then the ex-ante debt choice aﬀects the strength of the date t externality. As I will show, this
logic implies that generally the date s debt choice of the hedge fund is ineﬃcient. The result is one of the
intellectual underpinnings of prudential capital or liquidity requirements, or more generally, regulation of
the balance sheet liquidity of the ﬁnancial sector.
The externality is present in both the multiple equilibria and ampliﬁcation cases presented. To simplify
exposition, I focus on the ampliﬁcation case presented in Figure 2, equilibrium E1. With probability 1 − Φ
the G state realizes and the price is ¯ P, while with probability Φ the B state realizes and the equilibrium is
at E1.
I carry out the following experiment. Suppose that a hedge fund increases the date s debt ﬁnancing of ds
by a small amount and reduces the equity contribution by the same small amount so that the date s asset
position is unchanged. I compute the ex-ante valuation of this change for a single fund and contrast this
number with the same computation when the entire hedge fund class increases ds. As one would conjecture,
both of these valuations are negative since increasing ds increases endogenous liquidations. The interesting
result is that generally the private cost of debt is smaller than the social cost, suggesting that agents may
over-leverage in equilibrium. Note that my experiment is silent on the beneﬁt of debt over equity ﬁnancing.
Rather than getting into a model of corporate ﬁnancing to derive this advantage, I will imagine ﬁxing this
beneﬁt and holding it constant across the two computations.
Consider ﬁrst the single agent computation. A hedge fund’s expected value from asset holding, given ds
and P ω
t , is:
V P = (1 − Φ) ¯ P + Φ
￿
(1 − Lt) ¯ P + LtP B
t
￿
The ﬁrst term in this expression reﬂects the payoﬀ in the G state in which case the asset is held to realize
the fundamental value of ¯ P. The second term is the payoﬀ when there are Lt assets liquidated in the E1
equilibrium.
Diﬀerentiating this expression, I ﬁnd:
∂V P
∂ds









14where the second line follows from expression (5). The cost of higher leverage is that the asset may be
liquidated early at price P B
t rather than held to maturity to yield a payoﬀ of ¯ P.
For the entire hedge fund class, the computation needs to account for the fact that P B
t is aﬀected by the
choice of ds:
V S = (1 − Φ) ¯ P + Φ
￿










































where these derivatives are negative.
Intuitively, the social cost of debt is higher than the private cost of debt because a single hedge fund does
not take into account that its increasing ds makes the fund have to liquidate more asset at date t, pushing
prices lower at date t, which in turn results in greater liquidations by other hedge funds. Since the market
price is endogenous at date t to the trades of the hedge funds, the trading externality that is present at date
t translates into a ﬁnancing externality at date s.
Thus a central bank policy that restricts date s leverage, or imposes a minimum equity capital require-
ment, can improve welfare. These are common regulations for commercial banks, and some of the recent
policy discussion regards extending these regulations to other parts of the ﬁnancial sector including hedge
funds and investment banks.
In more general settings, the externality leads to “underinsurance” against the crisis equilibrium – the
leverage externality of the current model is just one instance of underinsurance. Consider for instance a
model in which there are many states at date t, in which in only some of the states is equilibrium at E1; in
other states the equilibrium is either at ¯ P or at the vertical segment of the liquidation function. In such a
model, the optimal policy will call for agents to have more liquid balance sheets (i.e more w, less d) in only
the crisis states. Thus more generally the policy I have outlined concerns the risk management of balance
sheet liquidity. The externality leads agents to make ex-ante asset and liability choices that leaves them with
a less liquid balance sheet in crisis states.
15Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) study the underinsurance externality in the context of emerging
market crises and discuss ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choices over domestic and foreign currency debt arguing that
ﬁrms will undervalue the insurance beneﬁt of denominating debt in domestic currency. Gromb and Vayanos
(2002) study a similar externality in a dynamic model of collateral constrained arbitrage and show that the
arbitrageurs trade too early in trying to proﬁt from the arbitrage opportunity. Allen and Gale (2004) discuss
the source of the ineﬃciency in banking/ﬁnancial markets models. The ineﬃciency of equilibrium in these
papers is an example of a more primitive result derived by Geanokoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) on the
generic ineﬃciency of equilibrium in incomplete markets.
Finally, strictly speaking if I deﬁne welfare in the current model as the sum of hedge fund/household
and deep-pocket investor utility, then since liquidations just leads to transfers, the date s debt choice does
not aﬀect welfare. It is straightforward to consider setting where quantities (i.e. real investment) adjusts
and describe ex-ante policies that are Pareto improving. See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003, 2004) or
Lorenzoni (2008) for a full treatment of ex-ante policies.
3 Ampliﬁcation through Uncertainty
In early 2007, banks were well capitalized and ﬂush with cash. Similar statements of health could be made
about most of the key pieces of the ﬁnancial sector. In terms of the model just discussed, w − d was high.
From the vantage of the balance sheet liquidation mechanism, these benign initial conditions make it hard
to understand the extent of the recent crisis.
I argue in this section that an important ampliﬁcation mechanism in the recent crisis has to do with
lack of knowledge and uncertainty. Investors had rapidly adopted a ﬁnancial innovation – the credit market
structures – with which they had a limited history. When AAA subprime tranches suﬀered losses, investors
realized that they had not understood the securitized credit structures they had purchased. Investors were
not surprised that high-risk homeowners defaulted on some loans; rather, they were surprised that such
defaults had a material eﬀect on the values of the most senior of the tranches backed by pools of subprime
mortgages. Moreover, given that a myriad other credit products - not just mortgage – had been structured
in much the same way as subprime investments, investors’ model-uncertainty was across the entire credit
market.
Thus, the small cash-ﬂow shock of subprime defaults resulted in a large shock to investors’ uncertainty.
16Moreover there was contagion across the entire credit market due to investors’ model uncertainty. The
response of investors to their uncertainty was to disengage. Investors went back to the drawing board to
formulate new models. In the meantime, given that they did not have a clear understanding of events, they
took decisions to protect themselves against worst-case scenarios on the risks that they did not understand.
The result of all of this disengagement was a loss of liquidity, with many attendant eﬀects.
Investors’ dramatic disengagement and emphasis on protecting against a worst-case event is hard to
capture within a standard model of decision making. In the standard model, agents consider all possible
models — for example, models in which AAA tranches are not risky and those in which they are risky
— placing probabilities on each of the possible models, and then making decisions that average over the
models in a Bayesian fashion. The shock (i.e. AAA defaults) leads agents to adjust their model-probabilities,
increasing their weight on the model in which AAA tranches are risky. Of course such a reassessment leads
to lower prices on the AAA tranches. But, it does not lead to disengagement nor the worst-case decision
rules that have been witnessed recently.10
The main diﬃcult with the standard model in capturing these events is that under the Savage axioms for
decision-making, model uncertainty and risk regarding cash-ﬂows are treated the same way. Indeed, leaving
aside the subprime example that I have given, there is a long tradition in Economics dating back to Knight
(1921) that recognizes that risk and uncertainty provoke diﬀerent behavioral responses. The point is most
clearly made in the Ellsberg (1961) paradox. Giving people choices between gambles where some gambles
had clearly speciﬁed odds, while others did not, Ellsberg found that people consistently avoided the gambles
with unknown odds. In fact, Ellsberg found that one could combine the known and unknown gambles in
ways that showed that people violated the Savage axioms.
Beginning with Gilboa and Schmeidler (1988), there have been a number of papers aimed at developing
a theory of decision-making that distinguishes between risk and uncertainty and is consistent with the
behavior noted by Ellsberg. Consider a decision problem where a state ω ∈ Ω will be realized tomorrow.
The probability distribution over the states is denoted by π. An agent makes a decision d ∈ D today that
results in utility u(c(ω,d)) in state ω. The standard Expected Utility representation of this decision problem
10Routledge and Zin (2005) argue similarly that the trading-halts (near zero trading volume) and disengagement we observe
during ﬁnancial crises are an important reason to think that these events are about Knightian uncertainty. Routledge and Zin
develop a model in which uncertainty leads to a trading hald and widening of bid-ask spreads.




Suppose however that agents are uncertain over the probability distribution π. In particular, suppose that
this uncertainty is that agents only know that π ∈ Π. Then, Gilboa and Schmeidler’s Maximin Expected






The “min” operator is the key here: agents use a worst-case for the uncertain probabilities π when making
their decision.
In the subprime example, one may consider that agents had a model π ∈ Π0 in mind at the beginning
of 2007. The default events led them to become uncertain, so that they considered a larger class of models
Π1 (e.g., Π0 ⊂ Π1). Although the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) theory is not dynamic and therefore does
not explain how agents’ priors are updated, there has been subsequent work in the decision theory literature
that does (see Hanany and Klibanoﬀ, 2007, for discussion of this research).
This section presents extensions of the model to incorporate Knightian uncertainty, in ways guided by
the recent credit crisis, and shows that the model can well capture recent events. I then turn to a discussion
of some other historical crises in light of the uncertainty model, arguing that the subprime case illustrates a
more general pattern present in other ﬁnancial crises. Finally, I discuss policy in the uncertainty model and
compare it to policy in the balance sheet liquidation model.
3.1 Crisis at Date s
The uncertainty channel that I explore is a dynamic one: it works through the eﬀects on current decisions
of anticipating future liquidity problems. For the purpose of modeling, I shift the focus of the model from
date t back to date s. Agents at date s are uncertain over outcomes at date t and this may lead to liquidity
problems at date s. That is, date s is no longer a benign initial condition of the previous section’s analysis,
but is the “crisis” date itself. I am centrally interested in agent decisions and the asset price at date s.
I set ds to zero and remove the leverage channel of the previous section. I instead analyze a new concern
that stems from anticipating liquidity supply problems at date t. Suppose that a “liquidity provider” stands-
by to purchase the asset if investors wish to liquidate at date t. After describing the model, I provide some
examples of such a liquidity provider.
18The liquidity provider has resources of L — cash, or some other liquid medium — to back up the
commitment. My key assumption is that the supply of liquidity is limited. If liquidations are suﬃciently






that is, the L resources are divided evenly to all liquidators.11
I consider a richer speciﬁcation of the date t liquidity shocks. There are two classes of hedge funds, A
and B, each in unit mass. Each of these classes may receive an exogenous liquidation shock at date t with
probability φ. Thus, the states at date t are ω ∈ {No,A,B,AB}, with probabilities {(1−φ)2,φ(1−φ),φ(1−
φ),φ2}.
I assume that L satisﬁes:
¯ P < L < 2 ¯ P.
Thus, in the cases of no or one shock, the intermediary has suﬃcient L to redeem shares at a price of ¯ P,






Then the price of the asset at date s is Ps = E[Pt], or,
Ps = ¯ P − ( ¯ P − L/2)φ2. (8)
We can think of ( ¯ P −L/2)φ2 as the liquidity discount on the asset. The anticipated liquidation shocks leads
to a crisis discount at date s itself. Clearly this discount is decreasing in L.
Here are some examples of liquidity providers with limited liquidity in the current context. Commercial
banks provide backup commitments to asset-backed facilities; i.e. if investors do not roll over their com-
mercial paper loans to the facility, the commercial bank provides the loan. This type of liquidity provision
arrangement arises both in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market as well as in sponsored in-
vestment vehicles (SIVs) (see Acharya and Schnabl (2009) and Gorton (2008) on commercial banks and their
11This formulation, in terms of a liquidity provider, provides one way to think about the Pt(L) function of the previous
section. That is, the price is the result from selling Lt shares to an investor with total resources of L. Also note that this
formulation diﬀers from the sequential service constraint of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In that paper, the ﬁrst liquidators to
arrive at the bank receive more money than later liquidators – in my formulation, all liquidators are treated equally.
19SIVs). It follows, as in the model, that if investors forecast that a sponsoring commercial bank will suﬀer
losses causing L to fall, Ps will fall, corresponding to the rise in spreads on ABCP.
Consider another example. Hedge funds contract credit lines from commercial banks to provide them
with emergency liquidity. Suppose that the liquidity provider is a commercial bank with limited L. Hedge
funds A and B purchase credit lines to protect against their liquidity shocks. If both hedge funds receive
liquidity shocks, they exhaust the commercial bank’s liquidity, which may cause them to liquidate the asset
in order to oﬀset the liquidity shock. The anticipation of this scenario causes Ps to be low.
3.2 Counterparty Risk
The shock probabilities for each class of investors, A and B, is φ. I have thus far discussed the shocks as if
they are known to be independent, but suppose that the shocks have correlation of ρ, possibly diﬀerent than
zero. Moreover, suppose that agents are uncertain over the value of ρ, knowing only that ρ ∈ [−1,+1].
The problem of an investor at date s is to decide how much to pay for the asset, given the agent’s
probability of liquidation and the promised price-support. Uncertainty enters into this decision because the
agent knows that the liquidity provider has limited resources, and if shocks to both A and B occur at the
same time, it will not be able to provide full price support.
This way of introducing uncertainty captures “counterparty risk.” Will the liquidity provider be able
to deliver on its commitment when needed, or will other shocks deplete its liquidity so that it (partially)
defaults? In the current context, the concern may be will the commercial bank suﬀer losses on its subprime
investments, causing L to fall. Alternatively, the concern may be that hedge fund A worries that hedge fund
B will suﬀer losses and need liquidity, depleting the liquidity of a commercial bank that has provided a credit
line to both hedge funds. Note that even if A can accurately assess his own shock probability to be φ, the
modeling is that he may be uncertain about the shock distribution for B. This is another way of thinking
about counterparty risk – i.e., A’s concern is will risks to other agents end up aﬀecting him?
It is obvious that in the simple setup the “worst-case” for the agents is if ρ = +1. The maximin decision
rule is to purchase the asset assuming that the counterparty risk is the highest. The date s price is then
Ps = ¯ P − ( ¯ P − L/2)φ. (9)
Comparing this expression to that in equation (8), we see that uncertainty magniﬁes the importance of the
liquidation event from order φ2 to order φ.
203.3 Individual Exposure to Aggregate Risk
In the recent crisis, banks have been unsure of the extent of their own exposure to subprime and related
credit risks. The problem stems from the complexity of these instruments. Diﬀerent parts of banks have
diﬀerent risk exposures. Taking stock of all of this to provide an overall risk picture for a bank has taken
time and proven diﬃcult. The problem has been compounded because in many cases the markets for the
relevant assets have become illiquid, making it diﬃcult to measure market values.
On the other hand, it has been easier to estimate the aggregate losses stemming from subprime defaults.
That is, beginning with the subprime borrowers, one can estimate default probabilities and recovery rates on
default, and provide an upper bound on the subprime losses. Brunnermeier (2008) reports an over-estimate
here of $500 bn. The uncertainty over the credit market structures is what has made it diﬃcult to measure
individual exposures to the aggregate risk.
Consider the following variation of the model. Suppose that at date t there are only two states, shock
or no-shock (with probabilities φ and 1 − φ). In the shock state, only one of either agents A or B receive
a liquidity shock. Agents are uncertain over which agent will receive the shock. Denote φA and φB as the
shock probabilities for A and B. Since only one of A or B will receive the shock,
φA + φB = φ
However, suppose that A is uncertain over the value of φA. A only knows that φA ∈ [φ/2 − K,φ/2 + K]
(K ≤ φ/2). The treatment of B is symmetric.12
It is easy to see how the uncertainty aﬀects the date 0 decision. The worst-case for the agent is if their
shock probability is φ/2 + K. Then the agents price the asset so that,
Ps = ¯ P − ( ¯ P − L/2)(φ/2+ K).
Uncertainty reduces the asset price, increasing the importance of the liquidation state. (I have normalized
things by assuming that the intermediary has L/2 units of liquidity, since liquidity needs have been halved
relative to the previous extension.)
12In this model, one solution to the uncertaintyproblem is for A and B to cross-insure each other. Both buy insurance against
their own shock state and sell insurance against the others’ shock state. I am assuming that markets are incomplete so that
this trade is not possible. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) develop a related model based on uncertainty over idiosyncratic
exposures to aggregate shocks where markets are complete, yet the equilibrium is qualitatively similar to the one described
here. The main modeling diﬀerence is that in Caballero and Krishnamurthy, the model is completely symmetric – there is no
distinction between “A” and “B” types.
213.4 Wasted Liquidity
Thus far I have discussed how increases in uncertainty lead to a fall in the asset price at date s. This section
discusses a second eﬀect of increases in uncertainty. Increased counterparty risk typically triggers demands
to create a “safer” contract. Agents require more collateral from counterparties. A hedge fund pulls its
business from a weaker bank and recontracts with a safer bank. When triggered by uncertainty, the demand
for safety can lead to wasted liquidity, as I explain next.13
To ﬁx ideas, let us focus on the hedge fund/credit line interpretation of the model. Moreover, suppose
that the liquidation shocks occur not at time t, but at some time between s and t. If hedge fund A receives
such a shock, it immediately requires resources and draws down its credit line from the liquidity provider.
Hedge fund A may receive a liquidation shock between s and t, and then, possible, hedge fund B may
receive another shock. As before, there are four possible histories at date t; ω ∈ {No,A,B,AB(BA)} with
probabilities {(1 − φ)2,φ(1− φ),φ(1− φ),φ2}.
Since now shocks arrive between s and t, and liquidity is needed at the time the shock arrives, liquidity
must be provided at a time before t. Importantly, the bank cannot wait until time t to decide how much
of its L to allocate to each fund (as in the previous examples). Deﬁne the pair (L1,L2) as the liquidity
provided to the ﬁrst and second shock, respectively. We can imagine that the credit line speciﬁes ex-ante a
pair (L1,L2).
With this change in the modeling, a credit line arrangement has to be optimized over L1 and L2, subject
to L1 +L2 = L. But, the sequential shock structure in the economy immediately implies that any optimized
pair (L1,L2) must have the property that
L1 > L2.
That is, since conditional on one shock arriving, the probability of the second shock arriving is strictly less
than one, it is better to provide more resources to the ﬁrst shock than the second shock. Given risk neutrality
in all agents’ preferences, it is optimal to set the ratio
L1
L2 equal to 1
φ, unless such a solution involves L1 > ¯ P.
If φ is suﬃciently low, then the solution is to set L1 = ¯ P and L2 = L − ¯ P.
Consider this latter case; φ is suﬃciently small that,
L1 = ¯ P > L2 = L − ¯ P.
That is, it is optimal to set L1 suﬃciently high that the hedge fund with the ﬁrst shock receives enough
13The section draws heavily from Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008).
22funds to fully absorb its liquidation shock at price ¯ P, leaving less than ¯ P for a potential second hedge fund
shock.
The date s asset price is,
Ps = ¯ P − φ2( ¯ P − L/2)2.
As before, there is a liquidity discount.
Now, suppose we introduce uncertainty into this environment. A is uncertain over the value of φB,
considering values of φB ∈ [φ − K,φ + K] (K ≤ min[φ,1− φ]). The treatment of B is symmetric. That is,
each hedge fund is uncertain over the other fund’s shock probability.
If K is suﬃciently large that the φ + K is close to one, then A will be concerned that B will receive the
liquidity shock ﬁrst, depleting the bank’s liquidity, leaving too little liquidity for A (i.e. L2 < L1). Given
this fear, the price of the asset will be,
Ps = ¯ P − φ( ¯ P − L/2)2.
As before, the uncertainty concern reduces the asset price, magnifying the importance of the liquidation
event from order φ2 to order φ.
There is a new result that emerges from the sequential-shock model. Consider that A (and B) will prefer
the following alternative credit line arrangement: The liquidity provider writes two independent contracts,
each collateralized by L/2 units of liquidity. Contract A promises upto L/2 liquidity to hedge fund A
regardless of what happens to B, and likewise for contract B.14
This implementation disentangles the A shock from the B shock, removing counterparty risk. Eﬀectively
each hedge fund disengages from the risks that he does not understand and guarantees a known amount of
liquidity for himself. The hedge funds then price the asset at date s requiring only the knowledge of their
own shock-probability. Hence,
Ps = ¯ P − ( ¯ P − L/2)φ.
For
¯ P − L/2 < 2 ¯ P − L,
or,
L < 2 ¯ P,
14This two contract implementation can also be thought of as setting L1 = L2.
23which is the maintained assumption, the liquidity discount is smaller under the over-collaterization arrange-
ment. From a hedge fund’s standpoint, removing counterparty risk through over-collateralization provides a
better outcome than contracting with a liquidity provider and running the risk that the provider will default.
The over-collateralization scheme though comes at a cost. Part of the liquidity provider’s resources of
L/2 are wasted in the equilibrium because there are states at date t, the ones in which only one of A or
B receive the liquidation shock, in which the liquidity of the non-shock contract goes unused. Investors’
uncertainty causes the eﬀective supply of liquidity to contract.
Financial crises are not typically about an aggregate shortage of resources, but rather about the distri-
bution of these resources. Resources that could be valuably deployed stay on the sidelines. For instance, in
the recent credit market events, regulators have been concerned that many banks have been hoarding their
liquidity, causing the money market to be illiquid. Uncertainty-induced liquidity waste is one way to model
these outcomes.
3.5 History and Financial Innovation
The preceding extensions illustrate how a rise in Knightian uncertainty can lead to a lack of liquidity.15
My modeling choices in the extensions are guided by the subprime crisis. In this section, I turn to other
historical crisis episodes, interpreting these events in light of the uncertainty model.
The uncertainty model is most suited to environments where market participants have had a limited
experience in dealing with a particular asset. These circumstances provide fertile ground for “unusual”
events – such as the losses on AAA rated subprime tranches. That is, it is likely that something occurs
that is at odds with market participants’ models of the world. Knightian uncertainty and market illiquidity
follow naturally.
Consider in particular the following narrative of a ﬁnancial innovation. A successful ﬁnancial innovation
is a product that meets a market demand and is therefore taken up widely. In the subprime case, securitized
15The uncertaintymodel may remind the reader of an adverse selection model. That is, consider a model in which an investor
is worried that he may be purchasing the worst asset in a pool (i.e. the “lemon”). This is similar to the uncertainty averse
agent who is worried about a worst-case scenario when investing. Indeed, some observers have argued that adverse selection
problems have played an important role in the current mortgage crisis. These models are also similar in that the behavior of
agents is due to lack of information. However, an important implication of the uncertainty model is that it suggests that crises
are most likely to arise on new asset classes. An adverse selection problem can arise on any asset, new or old. The history I
review in this section thus seems like better motivation for the uncertainty model.
24credit products have come to proliferate the market in the short space of ﬁve years. Thus, by its very nature,
a successful ﬁnancial innovation provides market participants with only a short history and there will be
outcomes that people do not expect. The subprime case clearly ﬁts this narrative, but consider some other
historical episodes.
In 1970, the Penn Central Railroad defaulted on $82m of prime-rated commercial paper. The commercial
paper market at the time was not as mature as it is today. It had developed rapidly through the 1960s to meet
growing corporate borrowing needs. However, ratings were not ﬁne tuned and back-up liquidity facilities,
which are standard practice today, did not exist. When the default occurred, it spooked money-market
investors. These investors went back to the drawing board to re-evaluate their credit models and ratings
guidelines. The result was disengagement. Investors stopped buying commercial paper completely. Over
time, and with the Fed intervening by encouraging banks to buy commercial paper, the market normalized.
Contrast this event with the 1997 Mercury Finance - another commercial paper borrower – default on
$500m of paper. The default was much larger in real terms than Penn Central and was similarly a surprise
to the market. In contrast to the Penn Central case, there were no eﬀects on the commercial paper market.
The reason is that it quickly became clear that the default was a case of fraudulent accounting in Mercury
Finance. The uncertainty element that had been important in 1970 was not present.
Another example to illustrate these points is the stock market crash of October 19, 1987. The new
innovation in this episode was portfolio insurance strategies – that is, the synthetic replication of put options.
This was a strategy that had become increasingly common among investors in this period. However, in 1987
it was unclear how widespread these strategies were and how ﬁnancial markets would equilibrate in the
presence of portfolio insurance strategies. The speed of the market decline on October 19 took everyone by
surprise. Market makers widened their bid-ask spreads and other key market players pulled out of the market
completely. The result was a lack of liquidity. Many observers point to the option-replication drive sales
into an illiquid market as being an important factor in the market crash. Today, these types of replications
strategies are common and well understood by all market participants.
My last example is the hedge fund crisis of the fall of 1998. In this scenario, hedge funds were still a
relatively new and opaque ﬁnancial vehicle. Assets under hedge fund management had grown from around
$10 bn in 1991 to $80 bn in 1997 (still far less than the trillions under management today). In the fall
of 1998, even sophisticated market participants such as Long Term Capital Management were taken by
surprise by the unprecedented comovement of Russian government bond spreads, Brazilian spreads, and
25U.S. Treasury bond spreads. The standard risk management models that hedge funds used were no longer
applicable (Scholes, 2000). The result was that ﬁnancial market participants searched for new models and
made decisions based on worst-case scenarios. We now know that hedge funds had similar strategies and
had ﬁlled up a similar asset space, and that this was the source of the correlations. Indeed risk management
strategies post-1998 explicitly account for high-correlation illiquidity events. But at the time neither hedge
funds nor their creditor banks understood this point. The result of this uncertainty was illiquidity and
crisis.16
The preceding discussion covers three of the major ﬁnancial crises experienced in the U.S. over the last 50
years.17 Each of these episodes is associated with a ﬁnancial innovation, and occurred at a time when market
participants had only a limited history within which to understand ﬁnancial developments, suggesting that
Knightian uncertainty is an important factor in many ﬁnancial crises.
3.6 Policy
The crisis in the model is at date s. It arises because agents anticipate liquidity problems at date t and
adjust decisions at date s accordingly. Thus eﬀective crisis policies in the model are ones that reduce agents’
fears regarding liquidity problems at date t.
Here are two policies that have such a ﬂavor. First consider the price-ﬂoor policy discussed earlier.
Suppose that the central bank commits to purchase the asset if Pt falls below some P ∗ > L
2 . This policy
can have a large eﬀect in the uncertainty model. In the counterparty risk example, the increase in Ps due
to such a commitment is proportional to φ(P ∗ − L/2) in the uncertainty model, while in the no-uncertainty
case it is proportional to φ2(P ∗ − L/2). In the correlation risk example, the increase in Ps is proportional
to φ/2+ K, while in the no-uncertainty case, the increase is proportional to φ/2.
A lender of last resort policy is also valuable in the uncertainty model. Consider that if the central
bank commits to inject one unit of resources into the liquidity provider (increasing L) in the two-shock state
(where both A and B receive a shock), this commitment can have a large ex-ante eﬀect on the price Ps. The
policy raises Pt in the two-shock state and thereby has an order of magnitude larger eﬀect in the uncertainty
case than the no-uncertainty case. In eﬀect, the central bank delivers resources to the market in the states
16While in 1998 hedge funds were still a novel ﬁnancial vehicle, the large reported losses of the Amaranth hedge fund in 2006
barely caused a ripple in ﬁnancial markets.
17See Calomiris (1994) on the Penn Central default, Melamed (1998) on the 1987 market crash, Scholes (2000) on the events
of 1998, and Stewart (2002) or McAndrews and Potter (2002) on 9/11.
26that agents are most anxious about, which is why these policies have a large eﬀect.
In addition to raising Ps, these policies have an eﬀect on liquidity waste. Consider the eﬀect of the central
bank’s promise to add one unit of liquidity to the liquidity provider in the context of the wasted liquidity
example I have developed. With such a promise, each agent will be happy with a contract that delivers L+1
2
liquidity to that agent if he needs the liquidity. That is, each hedge fund will compute that the maximum
credit line that the liquidity provider can promise, without any uncertainty concerns, is L+1
2 . Now suppose
that only one shock hits the economy and the central bank does not deliver the extra unit of liquidity to the
liquidity provider. Note that even in this case, the hedge fund that is hit by the shock gets an extra 1
2 of
resources. The central bank’s promised liquidity injection changes decisions and contracts at date s in a way
that liquidity is more eﬃciently utilized. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) develop this point more fully,
discussing some of the welfare issues that arise when agents’ preference do not satisfy the Savage axioms.
While crisis policy is similar across the uncertainty and liquidation model, my conjecture is that there is
less scope for ex-ante balance sheet regulation in the model. In the liquidation model, the ex-ante policy is
to reduce leverage. As I have noted, in a more sophisticated model this policy will be about incentivizing
agents to improve risk management. Agents must increase the liquidity of their balance sheets only in the
states of the world where a liquidity event will occur. We then have the following question. Does the central
bank know which states are the uncertainty-crisis states? Consider that the central bank is in the same (or
worse) position as the private sector in forecasting how a crisis on a ﬁnancial innovation will unfold. Of
course the central bank can require a blunt policy such as carry more liquidity/reduce leverage/reduce asset
positions into all states of the world. But such a policy may be prohibitively costly since it distorts private
sector actions in non-crisis states, and these states may be the more likely ones.
Instead, the logic of the uncertainty model suggests that regulations to limit the aggregate size of a
ﬁnancial innovation may be optimal. That is, if the CDO credit structures were as complex as they have
come to be, but were in total only $1 trillion rather than $5 trillion, then the fallout from the uncertainty
shock would have had far less impact on the economy. The model suggests that something analagous to a
Tobin-tax, but directed only at ﬁnancial innovations, may be an optimal policy response. This conjecture
needs to be investigated more thoroughly.
274 Liquidity in a Crisis
Most observers use the phrase “lack of liquidity” to describe a crisis. Liquidity, unfortunately, is a word used
to describe many diﬀerent aspects of a crisis. This section discusses the diﬀerent senses in which there is
lack of liquidity in a crisis within the model I have presented. I relate the discussed notions of liquidity to
the diﬀerent ways in which liquidity is measured in empirical work.
In the models I have presented, the asset market is illiquid in the sense that the asset price falls below
the long-run fundamental of ¯ P. We can think of the spread ¯ P − P as a liquidity discount. For example,
if the underlying asset in the model is a defaultable corporate or mortgage bond, then it easy to translate
¯ P − P into the spread between the yield on the bond and the yield on a Treasury bond. In many bond
market crises, such spreads rise signiﬁcantly.
The empirical literature in ﬁnance oﬀers other ways to describe asset market liquidity, deﬁned broadly as
the ease with which an asset can be converted into a liquid medium such as cash or bank reserves. In a crisis,
market participants ﬁnd that their assets lose market liquidity. Potential trading partners are hard to ﬁnd
(Duﬃe, Garleanu, and Pedersen, 2005). Market-makers are reluctant to accumulate inventories and provide
immediacy to investors (Weill, 2007). It is common in the market micro-structure literature in ﬁnance to
measure market liquidity in terms of bid-ask spreads or price impact measures (Kyle, 1985, O’Hara, 1995,
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000) or trading volume and volatilitymeasures (Amihud, 2002, Acharya
and Pedersen, 2005). A number of papers measure the resiliency of an asset – how quickly the asset price
recovers following a large trade – by measuring the negative serial correlation in asset returns (Campbell,
Grossman and Wang, 1993, Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003).18
Liquidityis alsooften used to describe the condition of a ﬁnancial institution’s balance sheet. For example,
L is the cash-on-hand of the liquidity provider; more L means a more liquid balance sheet. Likewise the
equity cushion of w − d for the hedge funds is a measure of the hedge funds’ liquidity. Note that while
market liquidity describes a market equilibrium outcome, balance sheet liquidity describes the condition of a
particular actor in the market.
Balance sheet liquidity appears commonly in the corporate ﬁnance literature. An institution is liquid –
or not liquidity constrained – if its balance sheet contains predominantly cash-like or other easily saleable
assets, and its liabilities are tilted away from a hard-claim like short-term debt, for which default may lead
18Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) further distinguish between market liquidity and market liquidity risk – with the latter
carrying a risk premium on innovations to market liquidity.
28to bankruptcy, and towards softer claims like equity. In this instance, balance sheet liquidity is high: if
needed, the institution can repay all of its short-term debt and forestall bankruptcy. Empirical work in
corporate ﬁnance often uses cash or leverage to measure balance sheet liquidity (see Kashyap and Stein,
1995, Gatev and Strahan, 2006, Adrian and Shin, 2008ab). A common theme in many accounts of crises is
that institutions own long term assets, funded by short term debt, which results in a balance sheet with low
liquidity (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
A drying-up of liquidity is also used to describe deteriorating external ﬁnancing conditions. For example,
imagine in the model that m, the margin requirement, was to rise in a crisis. That would mean that the
lenders to the hedge fund raise their margin/collateral requirement and thereby tighten ﬁnancing terms.
More broadly, the literature refers to deteriorating external ﬁnancing conditions as a reduction in funding
liquidity.19 During crises, borrowers face higher costs in the loan market. A hedge fund that wants to
borrow using ﬁnancial securities as collateral (a “repo agreement”), faces higher collateral requirements
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008, Gorton, 2008). Adrian and Shin (2008a) document that repo market
volumes fall during crises. Unsecured lending, backed broadly by the balance sheet of an institution, also
becomes more costly to obtain. Volume of issuance in the commercial paper market falls and the spreads
of commercial paper yields over Treasury bill yields rise (Gatev and Strahan, 2006). Firms ﬁnd it diﬃcult
to rollover or renew lines of funding from banks. Banks also face higher costs of funding. The interbank
market for liquidity does not function smoothly. Many regulators during the recent subprime crisis expressed
concern that there was “gridlock” in the interbank market: banks were unwilling to lend to each other and
instead hoarded their reserves (McAndrews and Potter, 2002).
Many observers refers to a ﬂight to liquidity during a crisis: Investors scramble for liquidity, exiting
illiquid investments and seeking liquid investments during a crisis. They buy secondary market assets that
have high market liquidity, and prefer to hold portfolios in short-term safe claims such as bank deposits that
are de-facto liquid. Empirical work ﬁnds that the price diﬀerences between less and more liquid Treasury
bonds, which are otherwise similar, rises during crises (Krishnamurthy, 2001). Price diﬀerences between less
liquid corporate bonds, mortgage-backed securities, or Agency bonds and more liquid Treasury bonds also
19These diﬀerent senses of liquidity I have presented are alternative ways of looking at a particular equilibrium. In some
cases the distinctions may seem contrived. For example, funding liquidity is a term used to describe how easy it is to raise debt
ﬁnancing against an asset, while market liquidity refers to how easy it is to sell the asset outright. But, debt ﬁnancing is really
a contingent sale of the asset; the lender owns the asset if the borrower does not repay the loan, so that the lender must think
about the market liquidity of the asset in setting the terms of the loan.
29rise (Longstaﬀ, 2004, Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron, 2007, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen,
2008).
The ﬂight to liquidity is assumed in my model in that there is an exogenous liquidity shock suﬀered by
the hedge funds. One way of interpreting this shock is that the end-investors of the fund are scrambling for
liquidity and pulling their money out of the fund. In Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model of bank runs,
some households are assumed to receive a preference shock that motivates them to pull their money from
the bank. There is a deeper question of where these “liquidity” shocks arise; see the lengthy discussion in
Footnote 4.
The ﬁnal notion of liquidity that appears both in my model and the literature is macroeconomic or
monetary liquidity. The central bank or Treasury has control over the supply of government-backed assets.
These assets include money and bank reserves provided by the central bank as well as Treasury bonds, which
are among the most liquid assets in the marketplace. During crises, the central bank “supplies” liquidity to
ease the crisis, by for example, expanding the supply of bank reserves. The central bank also directly lends
reserves to commercial or investment banks through the discount window, accepting less liquid assets as
collateral. In the subprime crisis, the Fed has conducted swaps of (less liquid) mortgage-backed securities for
(more liquid) Treasury securities through the Term Securities Lending Facility. One can also see Treasury
Secretary Paulson’s original proposal to buy subprime mortgages in this light. The transaction absorbs less
liquid assets onto the government’s balance sheet, placing more liquid Treasury securities in private hands.
In the models I have presented, the government can improve outcomes when it absorbs less liquid assets
onto its balance sheet, providing more liquid government-backed assets to the private sector in return. The
various policies I have discussed can all be thought of in this light. For example, injecting equity capital
in the ﬁnancial sector, or oﬀering loans with lower margin requirements through the discount window are
examples of policies where the government accepts a stake in the distressed asset, providing cash to the
ﬁnancial sector in return. These transaction enhance the ﬁnancial sector’s balance sheet liquidity and drives
the beneﬁt to policy.
5 Conclusion
This paper has described two ampliﬁcations mechanisms – through balance sheets and through uncertainty –
that operate during liquidity crises and studied the scope for ex-ante and ex-post central bank policies under
30each mechanism. I have discussed the two mechanisms separately for pedagogical purposes, but there may
be interesting ways in which they interact. Let me conclude by oﬀering some thoughts on such interaction
eﬀects.
In the uncertainty model, agents are uncertain over the liquidation shock probabilities of other agents.
I have shown how the balance sheet mechanism creates an endogenous source of liquidation shocks that
depends on the leverage of agents. Suppose that agents are uncertain about the leverage of other agents.
Then, there will be uncertainty over the strength of the balance sheet mechanism – are we in the multiple
equilibrium region or not? – and this can lead to a larger liquidity discount at date s.20
The interaction may also run in the other direction. In the recent subprime crisis, I have argued that
the initial market dynamic was driven by uncertainty. As investors grappled with the complexities of credit
market instruments, their behavioral response caused asset prices to fall. At some point, balance sheet
constraints became an issue and the eﬀects highlighted by the balance-sheet/asset-price feedback began to
dominate the market.
Another interaction that seems interesting to study has to do with the informativeness of market prices.
Routledge and Zin (2005) develop a micro-structure model of asset trade in which Knightian uncertainty
leads to a trading halt and widening of bid-ask spreads. Their model suggests that uncertainty inhibits the
process of price discovery, rendering market prices uninformative about fundamental value. This too may
be interestingly related to balance sheet eﬀects. Accounting rules require that banks mark their books to
market prices. However in an environment of uncertainty, where market prices are suspect, such mark-to-
market accounting becomes diﬃcult (see Easley and O’Hara, 2009), and can possibly trigger balance sheet
ampliﬁers.
These observations can also shed light on how a market recovers from an uncertainty-driven crisis. It is
clear from the model I have outlined as well as the historical examples I have given that the uncertainty crisis
is only resolved over time as investors understand where they went wrong and formulate new models of the
world; in short, as the uncertainty is resolved. Part of this process involves information revelation. What
mistakes have investors made? Which investors have large exposures to the relevant assets, and how big are
their losses? In an environment where the price discovery mechanism is impaired, information revealed from
accounting statements is hard to interpret. Further, in an environment where balance sheets are weak, a
20As another example, consider that in 1998, the Russian default triggered a liquidation event in hedge-fund dominated
markets. The resulting unexpected correlation among market prices was a surprise to most market participants and triggered
an uncertainty dynamic.
31ﬁnancial institution may be reluctant to realize losses, impeding information revelation. These forces tend to
perpetuate an uncertain environment, which may be one factor behind the duration of the subprime crisis.
Indeed, from this perspective, a beneﬁt of the stress-tests performed by the Treasury in the current crisis is
that they force information revelation and reduce uncertainty.
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